By Advocate Karan Dua | Vintage Litigation, New Delhi | Published: August 2026

Two weeks ago, most people would’ve told you the answer was a flat no. Section 498A is about husbands and wives — that’s what the section says, that’s how it’s always been read, end of story. The Supreme Court just changed that story. Not entirely, not for everyone, but enough that if you’re in a live-in relationship right now, this ruling is worth understanding properly rather than picking up secondhand from a WhatsApp forward.

What the Court Actually Said

On August 1, 2026, in Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr. (2026 INSC 784), a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that Section 498A’s protection against cruelty — traditionally understood to apply only where a legal husband and wife are involved — can also extend to a live-in relationship, provided that relationship qualifies as being “in the nature of marriage” and both partners genuinely intended to marry.

That’s the headline. But the actual reasoning, and the limits the Court built into it, matter a lot more than the headline does.

The Case Behind the Ruling

The facts here are genuinely messy, which is part of why the case ended up at the Supreme Court in the first place. A woman alleged that she and Dr. Lokesh B.H. had married in 2010 and lived together in Bengaluru. In 2016, she filed two criminal complaints accusing him and his family of dowry harassment, physical assault, and — this is the part that made the case complicated — concealing that his earlier marriage was still legally valid.

Lokesh’s defence was straightforward on paper: if his first marriage hadn’t been dissolved, then his marriage to her was void. And if it was void, he argued, he couldn’t be her “husband” for the purposes of Section 498A, because the section is written for husbands, not for men in relationships the law doesn’t formally recognise.

The Karnataka High Court didn’t buy it. It held that Section 498A’s protection could extend to void or voidable marriages, and to live-in relationships resembling marriage. Lokesh appealed to the Supreme Court, and lost there too.

Why “Husband” Suddenly Means More Than the Dictionary Definition

Here’s the part of the judgment that actually does the heavy lifting. The Court rejected the idea that a penal provision like Section 498A has to be read in the narrowest possible way. Its reasoning went something like this: cruelty doesn’t check anyone’s marriage certificate before it does damage. A woman living with a man in a relationship that looks and functions exactly like a marriage — shared home, shared life, the whole arrangement — faces the same risk of harassment and abuse as a legally married woman does. Drawing a hard line at the marriage certificate, the Court said, would leave a whole category of women without protection for no good reason connected to what the law is actually trying to prevent.

The bench put it in fairly blunt terms: excluding these women from protection has no rational connection to the actual purpose of the law, which is preventing domestic cruelty. That’s an equality argument, not just a technical one — and it’s the kind of reasoning that tends to have staying power beyond the specific case it comes from.

But Not Every Live-In Relationship Qualifies — Here’s the Catch

This is where people reading headlines get the wrong idea, so it’s worth being precise. The Court did not say every live-in relationship is now covered by 498A. It set a real threshold, and it’s a two-part one.

First, the relationship has to be “in the nature of marriage” — meaning it functions like one. Living together, a shared household, financial interdependence, the relationship being presented socially as something like a marriage, that sort of thing. A casual relationship, a short-term arrangement, something without that marriage-like structure — that doesn’t qualify.

Second, and this is the part that actually narrows things the most: there has to be a genuine, mutual intention to marry. Not just cohabitation. Not just a long relationship. Actual intent, on both sides, to eventually marry.

Put those two together and you get something considerably narrower than “498A now applies to any boyfriend.” It applies to relationships that were essentially functioning as marriages, heading toward marriage, where one partner is accused of exactly the kind of cruelty the law was written to address.

Does the Same Safety Net Apply?

Yes, and this matters, especially for our male clients who reasonably worry that broader interpretations of 498A translate into broader risk of being arrested first and questioned later. The Court was explicit that the Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar safeguards — the ones requiring police to conduct a preliminary inquiry and record specific reasons before arrest — apply here too. No one accused of cruelty in a marriage-like live-in relationship, including relatives, should be arrested without that preliminary inquiry actually happening.

So this isn’t a one-way expansion of criminal liability with no corresponding protection. The same procedural checks that exist for married couples now extend to this category of live-in relationships as well.

This Isn’t Coming Out of Nowhere

If this feels like a sudden leap, it’s worth knowing it isn’t really one. Indian courts have been chipping away at the rigid “only formally married people get protection” position for a while now, just in different corners of family law. Live-in couples have had some recognition under the Domestic Violence Act for years, through the idea of a “relationship in the nature of marriage.” Courts have gradually extended inheritance and legitimacy protections to children born of long-term live-in relationships. What the Lokesh judgment does is bring 498A into that same broader pattern, rather than inventing something entirely new out of thin air.

That context matters for how much weight this ruling is likely to carry going forward. It’s not an isolated, surprising outlier that might get quietly walked back. It’s the Supreme Court applying a test — relationship in the nature of marriage, plus intent to marry — that already exists elsewhere in Indian law, to a provision where courts had previously been reluctant to apply it. That consistency is exactly why we’d expect this reasoning to hold up, and likely extend, rather than get narrowed in future cases.

Does This Apply to Section 85 BNS Too?

Good question, and honestly, the answer isn’t fully settled yet. Section 498A IPC has been replaced by Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which reproduces the same substance, with the definition of cruelty now sitting in a separate provision, Section 86. The Lokesh judgment itself was decided under the old Section 498A IPC, because the case originated before the BNS came into force.

Legal commentators are actively debating whether this reasoning carries over automatically to prosecutions under Section 85 BNS, or whether that question will need to be separately litigated and confirmed. Given that Section 85 substantially mirrors Section 498A’s language and purpose, most matrimonial lawyers expect courts to apply the same reasoning — but “expect” isn’t the same as “settled law,” and if your matter involves this exact question, it’s worth having your lawyer address it specifically rather than assuming either way.

The Void Marriage Angle Nobody’s Talking About Enough

There’s a layer to this case that a lot of the coverage glosses over, and it’s worth pulling out separately because it affects a specific, recurring situation we see in practice: a man who marries a woman while concealing that his earlier marriage is still legally subsisting.

Lokesh’s whole defence hinged on the idea that because his marriage to the complainant was void — his first marriage never having been dissolved — he couldn’t be treated as her “husband” for 498A purposes at all. That’s a genuinely clever argument on paper. Void means void, right? No marriage, no husband, no 498A.

The Court didn’t let that argument do the work he wanted it to. Even setting aside the live-in reasoning entirely, the Court noted that Section 498A has already been read by earlier decisions to cover void and voidable marriages, not just legally airtight ones — a principle that predates this case. So a man can’t use his own concealment of a prior marriage as a shield against a 498A complaint from the second relationship. If anything, that fact pattern — where a man’s own deception is what makes the second marriage void — is precisely the kind of situation the law is least sympathetic to when a defence tries to lean on the marriage’s technical invalidity.

This matters because it closes off what might otherwise have looked like a clever loophole: concealing a first marriage to make the second one void, and then using that same void status as a defence against cruelty allegations. The Court’s reasoning here, even independent of the live-in extension, shuts that door.

What This Doesn’t Change — And This Trips People Up

Here’s something worth being genuinely clear about, because we’ve already had clients assume that if 498A now covers live-in relationships, everything else must follow the same logic. It doesn’t.

Maintenance is the clearest example. Courts, including the Allahabad High Court in a recent ruling, have continued to hold that maintenance under Section 125 CrPC (now Section 144 BNSS) isn’t available to women in live-in relationships, because they don’t acquire the legal status of a “wife” under that specific provision. We’ve covered this distinction in our roundup of recent Supreme Court maintenance judgments, and it’s a useful reminder that Indian family law doesn’t move as one connected block — a woman’s protection under a criminal cruelty provision and her entitlement to maintenance are governed by completely separate statutory frameworks, with separate tests, and this ruling only moved one of them.

So: a woman in a qualifying live-in relationship now has a real path to 498A protection if she’s facing cruelty. That same woman doesn’t automatically get maintenance rights just because this ruling exists. Two different questions, two different answers.

If You’re a Man in a Live-In Relationship: What This Actually Means

We’ll be direct, since a lot of our clients approach this from exactly this angle. If you’re in a live-in relationship that has the character of a marriage — shared home, shared finances, a relationship both of you have treated as heading toward marriage — you should understand that Section 498A’s protections and its risks now apply to you the same way they would if you were formally married.

That doesn’t mean panic. It means the same practical steps that matter in any 498A situation matter here too: understand what conduct actually constitutes cruelty under the statute, know that the Arnesh Kumar safeguards protect you from automatic arrest, and if a complaint is filed or threatened, get proper legal advice early rather than assuming the informal nature of the relationship gives you some kind of automatic immunity. It doesn’t, not anymore, not if the relationship meets that “nature of marriage plus intent to marry” test. Our detailed guide on what to do if you’re facing a false 498A complaint covers the practical defence steps in depth, and everything in it is now equally relevant whether you’re married or in a qualifying live-in relationship.

If You’re a Woman in a Live-In Relationship: What This Actually Means

If you’re in a live-in relationship and facing cruelty — harassment, dowry-related demands, physical harm — from your partner or his family, this ruling gives you a real legal avenue that, until two weeks ago, courts were inconsistent about recognising. You’re not automatically excluded from 498A protection simply because there’s no marriage certificate.

But you’ll need to be able to show your relationship genuinely had the character of a marriage, and that there was real, mutual intent to marry — not just that you were living together. This is a factual question, and the strength of your case will depend on how well you can document the relationship’s actual nature: how long you lived together, how the relationship was presented to family and friends, any concrete steps taken toward marriage, shared financial arrangements, and so on. Vague assertions of a long relationship, without more, are less likely to meet the threshold the Court set out.

A Realistic Example

A couple lives together for four years, having told both families they intend to marry once certain family objections are resolved. The relationship deteriorates, and the woman alleges she was subjected to persistent harassment and physical abuse by her partner and his mother, who lived with them. Before this ruling, a lawyer might have told her that 498A simply wasn’t available to her because there was no marriage. Now, her lawyer’s first job is establishing the facts that bring her within the Lokesh framework — the shared household, the consistent representation of the relationship as heading toward marriage, any concrete engagement plans or family discussions about the wedding — because if that foundation is solid, the same protection a married woman would have is now genuinely available to her too.

What to Do If This Applies to Your Situation

• If you’re facing an accusation, don’t assume the informal nature of your relationship protects you automatically — get legal advice on whether your relationship meets the “nature of marriage” and “intent to marry” thresholds, and what that means for your specific facts.
• If you’re the one alleging cruelty, start documenting the character of your relationship now — shared address proof, joint financial arrangements, communications referencing marriage plans, anything that shows this wasn’t just cohabitation.
• Either way, don’t assume this ruling automatically extends to other rights or protections — maintenance, property, and inheritance questions in live-in relationships remain governed by entirely separate, and generally more limited, legal frameworks.
• If your matter involves Section 85 BNS rather than the old Section 498A IPC, raise this specifically with your lawyer, since whether this reasoning definitively extends to the new provision hasn’t been separately confirmed by the courts yet.

Frequently Asked Questions

1. Does this mean any live-in relationship is now covered by Section 498A?

No. The relationship has to genuinely resemble a marriage — shared household, the character of a marital relationship — and both partners need to have had a real, mutual intent to marry. Casual or short-term relationships don’t meet this threshold.

2. What exactly does “relationship in the nature of marriage” mean?

It generally refers to a relationship that functions like a marriage in practice — a shared home, financial interdependence, and the relationship being treated as a long-term, marriage-like commitment by both partners, and often recognised as such by family and community.

3. How do you actually prove “intent to marry”?

Through the surrounding facts — discussions about marriage with family, engagement plans, any documentation or communication referencing a future wedding, and generally how the relationship was represented to others. There’s no single document that proves this on its own.

4. Can a live-in partner’s family also be prosecuted, like in-laws would be?

Based on the reasoning in this case — which involved allegations against the man and his family members — yes, the same extension applies to family members in a qualifying live-in relationship, just as it would in a formal marriage.

5. Are the arrest safeguards the same as in a regular 498A case?

Yes. The Court specifically held that the Arnesh Kumar safeguards — a preliminary inquiry and recorded reasons before arrest — apply to accusations arising from a qualifying live-in relationship, just as they do in marriages.

6. Does this mean I can now claim maintenance from my live-in partner?

No — this ruling is specifically about Section 498A’s cruelty protection. Maintenance under Section 125 CrPC / Section 144 BNSS remains unavailable to women in live-in relationships under current case law, based on a separate legal test entirely.

7. Does this apply to Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, or only the old Section 498A IPC?

The judgment itself was decided under Section 498A IPC. Whether the same reasoning automatically applies to Section 85 BNS is still being debated among legal commentators and hasn’t been definitively confirmed by the courts — worth raising specifically with your lawyer if this applies to your case.

8. If we were only together for a few months, does this ruling apply to us?

Probably not, though it depends on the specific facts. Courts are likely to weigh the duration and depth of the relationship as part of assessing whether it genuinely had the character of a marriage — a very short relationship makes that threshold harder to meet.

9. What if my partner denies we ever intended to marry?

This becomes a factual dispute the court will need to assess based on the evidence each side presents — which is exactly why documenting the relationship’s nature and any marriage-related discussions matters so much if you’re the one relying on this protection.

10. Is this ruling only relevant to Hindu couples, or does it apply broadly?

The reasoning isn’t tied to any specific personal law — it’s about how “husband” is interpreted under a general criminal provision. It should, in principle, apply regardless of the partners’ religion, though this is worth confirming with your lawyer if your situation involves a specific personal law context.

11. My “husband” concealed an earlier marriage, so ours is void. Does that mean I can’t file a 498A complaint?

No, and this is actually a separate but related point the Court addressed in the same case — a void marriage, including one made void by the husband’s own concealment of a prior marriage, doesn’t automatically block a 498A complaint. Courts have already read the provision to cover void and voidable marriages, independent of the live-in question.

12. How new is this ruling, and should I expect the position to change again soon?

It’s very new — decided August 1, 2026. Given that it builds on an existing, consistent pattern in how courts treat live-in relationships across other areas of family law, it’s unlikely to be quickly overturned, though the specific question of its application to Section 85 BNS may still see further clarification.

Disclaimer: This article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Every case is fact-specific — consult a qualified advocate regarding your specific circumstances before taking any legal action.

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